I am not following the war in detail; my sources are MSM. I read about a highly anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive but not much once it actually started, which tells me it was a dud. As you say, Ukraine has done damage to the Russian fleet.
My mental framework for the war is conventional and consists of two commonly accepted premises:
First, to remove an entrenched defender requires a significant tactical advantage: firepower, maneuvering, manpower, etc. The fizzle of the Ukrainian counteroffensive indicates that they don't yet have that advantage.
Second, a nation does not control disputed territory until it has grunts on the ground. I don't think Ukraine has enough grunts to kick the Russians out.
My prediction is that the tactical situation in eastern Ukraine will be largely unchanged when the next President is inaugurated in just over a year. Russia will still be entrenched in those four oblasts; Ukraine certainly will not be a member of NATO.
I am not following the war in detail; my sources are MSM. I read about a highly anticipated Ukrainian counteroffensive but not much once it actually started, which tells me it was a dud. As you say, Ukraine has done damage to the Russian fleet.
My mental framework for the war is conventional and consists of two commonly accepted premises:
First, to remove an entrenched defender requires a significant tactical advantage: firepower, maneuvering, manpower, etc. The fizzle of the Ukrainian counteroffensive indicates that they don't yet have that advantage.
Second, a nation does not control disputed territory until it has grunts on the ground. I don't think Ukraine has enough grunts to kick the Russians out.
My prediction is that the tactical situation in eastern Ukraine will be largely unchanged when the next President is inaugurated in just over a year. Russia will still be entrenched in those four oblasts; Ukraine certainly will not be a member of NATO.