Thank you for your thoughtful comment. This is a topic that is well-nigh impossible to present a well-considered argument, one way of another. You are certainly correct that the Biden administration was unprepared for the invasion -- after all, look how they handled Afghanistan. As a result, we have indeed been on the back foot since Day 1 and our administration's policy (such as it isn't) has been incoherent. Some of those being vociferous in opposition have been (and are being) obtuse.
But NATO was not a factor in Putin's thinking; perhaps I should soften that to not the critical factor. Putin has been planning for the annexation of Ukraine since his Day 1. When I say "planning," I really mean intent, more than a rigidly formulated plan, ready for execution at a moment's notice, although the swiftness with which he was able to act after the botched withdrawal does show a significant degree of preparedness (and a considerable degree of misunderstanding).
What Putin saw was what he thought was his moment -- Putin would have invaded in that moment regardless of the NATO question; that's what I mean it was not a critical factor -- if the NATO idea was never floated or was taken off the table, it would not have prevented Putin's invasion.
I can't think of a way to present this without it sounding like a gross oversimplification, but here goes: Putin's invasion of Ukraine is more akin to a personal and national crusade; personal because the collapse of the USSR, followed by Russia's humiliation in Chechnya, are the signal humiliations of his life. His goal is to redeem them. What happened with expansion of NATO rankled, but those countries are not the Motherland the way Ukraine is perceived to be. Putin is realistic enough to be able live with them being in NATO, but he wants Ukraine back in the fold, regardless of the NATO question. It's a matter of personal pride, national pride, and has almost religious overtones in a way we find hard to comprehend.
So you are right in the sense that Ukraine in NATO would foreclose his life's ambition in his lifetime, and that is important to him. But it is not the case that the threat of the foreclosure moved him to act in a "now or never" way -- given the opportunity, he took it. Had there been credible deterrence, as there was during Trump's presidency, he would not have done so. Had Ukraine been brought into NATO, he would have used everything in his playbook, short of invasion, to break up the deal.
Why? Because the only thing worse to him than not getting Ukraine back would to try and lose face by failing. The sting of what happened in Chechnya has not faded and Putin is determined never to be "that guy" who lead them to humiliation there. So he'd have been furious about NATO expanding to include Ukraine, but he would have had to accept it if he thought he'd be shown up as weak or ineffective.
The Russian elite (generally) feels the same way and so do many of the Russian people. This is constant in Russian history. Again (oversimplifying), it's akin to Russian feeling about the "Mongol Yoke" and the Great Patriotic War. But the Russians have never been rash. They play the game of "two steps forward, one step back" and have, since roughly Peter the Great. The invasion of Ukraine was Putin's "two steps forward" (following on various other actions he's taken since coming to power). In my opinion, the best that can be hoped for now is a change of administration to convince him to take one step back. That's in his playbook. He will bluster and threaten (as he's been doing) but when he sees it's not working, he'll agree, since in his view, he's still one step ahead (whatever that looks like).
This is in keeping with another military maxim: "Allow your adversary to carry as much face as he can away from the battlefield. Do not allow him to carry away anything else." The task for Trump, should he be elected, is to negotiate on that basis.
I'll just add the Putin has seen that iconic photo, too. He's acquainted with Trump from before, but he's just had in confirmed who he might be dealing with. That photo, I believe, will make him more amenable to taking one step back, should Trump be elected.
Final point: I want to clear that I think the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO would be a really dumb idea, especially now. It would serve no practical purpose for us, and it would be a gratuitous insult to Putin and Russia. Our leaders need to handle this like adults, not (as my rough speaking acquaintances in the military might have said in bygone days) a "dick-pulling contest" which is a weak person's game. Time will tell.
Thanks again to Glenn for his generosity and forbearance.
I disagree with your characterization of the Biden Admin here on a couple of points.
1. Regarding Afghanistan, Trump left Biden an untenable situation. He cut a deal with the Taliban in which he agreed to a timetable for US withdrawal. What did Trump get in return for agreeing to withdraw? And end to attacks on US forces. This wasn't the worst tradeoff in the world, but it did mean that if Biden reneged on Trump's agreement, attacks would resume. But the really insidious thing Trump did was cut the Afghan government out of the negotiations entirely. This undermined the Afghan government, which resulted in leaders of all parts of the counrty outside of Kabul cutting their own deals with the Taliban because they knew the government in Kabul was living on borrowed time. The Biden admin is not blameless here, but the worst that can be said is that they inherited a very bad hand and played it badly.
2. In the runup to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the Biden Admin made some brilliant moves involving the sharing of intelligence that deprived the Russians of any strategic surprise. Putin, in the Russian style, had some gamesmanship in the works (like absurd claims that Russia was provoked or Ukraine attacked first or whatever) that were completely undermined by the Biden Admin. Before the invasion started, everyone knew it was coming.
I agree with you in most other respects, although I do think there is a case to be made that earlier rounds of NATO expansion (eg, into the Baltics) were maybe not advisable. (I don't view than as in any way an adequate justification for Putin's invasion, however).
I should have clarified in my comment regarding the Biden administration's handling of Afghanistan that I was referring to the execution of the withdrawal itself, not the situation as a whole. The withdrawal was a shambles which signaled military incompetence to Putin, compounding the Biden administration's appearance of being weak and irresolute, and giving some additional impetus to Putin.
I do personally believe the earlier rounds of NATO expansion were not a great idea; how it improved our security is not clear to me, regardless of what the Russians felt. Large coalitions are by their nature less stable than smaller ones, and given the threat environment (which I feel the old NATO was adequate to deal with), it not evident what was gained. Further, the larger NATO is, the more likely it becomes that some event might trigger a cascade effect, with perhaps less flexibility to deal with it. So, overall, a poor move in my estimation. (My views were unclear in the original post.)
I take your point about the Biden administration's actions during the run-up to Putin's invasion. I also feel more could probably have been done then, and certainly after.
I also think there are unanswered questions (perhaps unanswerable in a definitive sense) as to why Putin's invasion was initially rather half-baked. When he perceived his moment had arrived, why wasn't his military better prepared? Was it simply a gross underestimation of what he was getting into? To what extent did he feel rushed before his window of opportunity narrowed? Did the possibility of bringing Ukraine into NATO at some point play a role there (not as an offensive threat in Russia but as foreclosing his ambitions)? Was he misinformed or misled? All of the above?
Such errors are not unusual and compound; many such incursions historically go badly, especially in the beginning (examples are too numerous to list, though in the Russian case, their invasion of Afghanistan might deserve a mention; I could also throw in Xerxes' invasion of Greece and Alcibiades' ill-considered invasion of Sicily just for fun). In many ways, this just looks like history repeating itself.
You raise an interesting point regarding the situation Trump left for Biden. Since Trump had no intention of losing the election, the "very bad hand" you mention was one Trump dealt to himself. How did Trump plan to play that hand in his second term? That's a moot point now (since I doubt very much anyone would credibly answer it). But I must suppose he believed it was the best hand he could get and he had some plan to deal with it. (That plan didn't account for COVID.)
In a way, it reminds me a bit of the situation Clinton inherited regarding Iraq. George H. W. Bush clearly didn't plan on losing that election, and absent Ross Perot, he almost certainly would not have. He believed he had another term to settle the situation, so he took a position that might be called either honorable or politically expedient (or both?) It backfired badly in the end, eventually resulting in two other invasions (by us), and here we are today.
Thank you for your input and thanks again to Glenn for graciously allowing this discussion.
Thank you for the reply. I did not mean to imply that I thought Trump was deliberately creating a mess in Afghanistan to leave it for Biden. On the contrary, I think that had Trump been elected he would have ended up being the one to reap that whirlwind - it was just bad policy and only a consequence of timing and the election result that it blew up on Biden's watch. Also a massive intelligence failure.
I agree with you that NATO expansion back in the day was probably not the wisest course, but I still think Putin reacts less out of responding to threat and more out of the desire to rebuild a fallen empire.
One of the craziest things to think about is that back a couple of decades ago, there was serious thought about allowing Russia to JOIN an expanded NATO, even after Putin was first elected but before he showed his true colors.
Yes, the idea things might have still gone sour had Trump been elected cannot be dismissed, although I doubt things overall would have turned out like they did. We will have to see what the future holds.
On your second point, quite so on both counts.
Yes, there were a lot of attempts at cooperation back then. I personally met with senior reps from Lavochkin to explore the possibility of a joint venture I had proposed. They gave us a briefing on the state of things in Russia at the time that was entirely eye opening. They also happened to be staying near where I lived, so I gave them a ride to their hotel. They showered me with gifts in return, including a bar of Russian chocolate. It was a fascinating experience. In the end, nothing came of it and that era (as I've heard) is not recalled fondly in Russia these days, for understandable reasons.
I have some memory of that (Russia joining NATO), though I never got the impression it was especially serious. You may be better informed than myself on that topic as my focus had shifted by that time, but I do recall a desire to enlist Russia's aid in the GWOT, and some overtures to that end. There seemed to be a spike in alarm after Beslan over Russia's possible response, but it faded (at least as far as I was aware) and Basayev's eventual death closed the issue. Around the time, awareness of Putin's true colors (as you say) I think was growing and became clear by 2008.
But I am being prolix now, and will close. You responses are appreciated, and as always, thanks again to Glenn.
Hi Marty,
Thank you for your thoughtful comment. This is a topic that is well-nigh impossible to present a well-considered argument, one way of another. You are certainly correct that the Biden administration was unprepared for the invasion -- after all, look how they handled Afghanistan. As a result, we have indeed been on the back foot since Day 1 and our administration's policy (such as it isn't) has been incoherent. Some of those being vociferous in opposition have been (and are being) obtuse.
But NATO was not a factor in Putin's thinking; perhaps I should soften that to not the critical factor. Putin has been planning for the annexation of Ukraine since his Day 1. When I say "planning," I really mean intent, more than a rigidly formulated plan, ready for execution at a moment's notice, although the swiftness with which he was able to act after the botched withdrawal does show a significant degree of preparedness (and a considerable degree of misunderstanding).
What Putin saw was what he thought was his moment -- Putin would have invaded in that moment regardless of the NATO question; that's what I mean it was not a critical factor -- if the NATO idea was never floated or was taken off the table, it would not have prevented Putin's invasion.
I can't think of a way to present this without it sounding like a gross oversimplification, but here goes: Putin's invasion of Ukraine is more akin to a personal and national crusade; personal because the collapse of the USSR, followed by Russia's humiliation in Chechnya, are the signal humiliations of his life. His goal is to redeem them. What happened with expansion of NATO rankled, but those countries are not the Motherland the way Ukraine is perceived to be. Putin is realistic enough to be able live with them being in NATO, but he wants Ukraine back in the fold, regardless of the NATO question. It's a matter of personal pride, national pride, and has almost religious overtones in a way we find hard to comprehend.
So you are right in the sense that Ukraine in NATO would foreclose his life's ambition in his lifetime, and that is important to him. But it is not the case that the threat of the foreclosure moved him to act in a "now or never" way -- given the opportunity, he took it. Had there been credible deterrence, as there was during Trump's presidency, he would not have done so. Had Ukraine been brought into NATO, he would have used everything in his playbook, short of invasion, to break up the deal.
Why? Because the only thing worse to him than not getting Ukraine back would to try and lose face by failing. The sting of what happened in Chechnya has not faded and Putin is determined never to be "that guy" who lead them to humiliation there. So he'd have been furious about NATO expanding to include Ukraine, but he would have had to accept it if he thought he'd be shown up as weak or ineffective.
The Russian elite (generally) feels the same way and so do many of the Russian people. This is constant in Russian history. Again (oversimplifying), it's akin to Russian feeling about the "Mongol Yoke" and the Great Patriotic War. But the Russians have never been rash. They play the game of "two steps forward, one step back" and have, since roughly Peter the Great. The invasion of Ukraine was Putin's "two steps forward" (following on various other actions he's taken since coming to power). In my opinion, the best that can be hoped for now is a change of administration to convince him to take one step back. That's in his playbook. He will bluster and threaten (as he's been doing) but when he sees it's not working, he'll agree, since in his view, he's still one step ahead (whatever that looks like).
This is in keeping with another military maxim: "Allow your adversary to carry as much face as he can away from the battlefield. Do not allow him to carry away anything else." The task for Trump, should he be elected, is to negotiate on that basis.
I'll just add the Putin has seen that iconic photo, too. He's acquainted with Trump from before, but he's just had in confirmed who he might be dealing with. That photo, I believe, will make him more amenable to taking one step back, should Trump be elected.
Final point: I want to clear that I think the inclusion of Ukraine in NATO would be a really dumb idea, especially now. It would serve no practical purpose for us, and it would be a gratuitous insult to Putin and Russia. Our leaders need to handle this like adults, not (as my rough speaking acquaintances in the military might have said in bygone days) a "dick-pulling contest" which is a weak person's game. Time will tell.
Thanks again to Glenn for his generosity and forbearance.
I disagree with your characterization of the Biden Admin here on a couple of points.
1. Regarding Afghanistan, Trump left Biden an untenable situation. He cut a deal with the Taliban in which he agreed to a timetable for US withdrawal. What did Trump get in return for agreeing to withdraw? And end to attacks on US forces. This wasn't the worst tradeoff in the world, but it did mean that if Biden reneged on Trump's agreement, attacks would resume. But the really insidious thing Trump did was cut the Afghan government out of the negotiations entirely. This undermined the Afghan government, which resulted in leaders of all parts of the counrty outside of Kabul cutting their own deals with the Taliban because they knew the government in Kabul was living on borrowed time. The Biden admin is not blameless here, but the worst that can be said is that they inherited a very bad hand and played it badly.
2. In the runup to Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the Biden Admin made some brilliant moves involving the sharing of intelligence that deprived the Russians of any strategic surprise. Putin, in the Russian style, had some gamesmanship in the works (like absurd claims that Russia was provoked or Ukraine attacked first or whatever) that were completely undermined by the Biden Admin. Before the invasion started, everyone knew it was coming.
I agree with you in most other respects, although I do think there is a case to be made that earlier rounds of NATO expansion (eg, into the Baltics) were maybe not advisable. (I don't view than as in any way an adequate justification for Putin's invasion, however).
Michael,
I should have clarified in my comment regarding the Biden administration's handling of Afghanistan that I was referring to the execution of the withdrawal itself, not the situation as a whole. The withdrawal was a shambles which signaled military incompetence to Putin, compounding the Biden administration's appearance of being weak and irresolute, and giving some additional impetus to Putin.
I do personally believe the earlier rounds of NATO expansion were not a great idea; how it improved our security is not clear to me, regardless of what the Russians felt. Large coalitions are by their nature less stable than smaller ones, and given the threat environment (which I feel the old NATO was adequate to deal with), it not evident what was gained. Further, the larger NATO is, the more likely it becomes that some event might trigger a cascade effect, with perhaps less flexibility to deal with it. So, overall, a poor move in my estimation. (My views were unclear in the original post.)
I take your point about the Biden administration's actions during the run-up to Putin's invasion. I also feel more could probably have been done then, and certainly after.
I also think there are unanswered questions (perhaps unanswerable in a definitive sense) as to why Putin's invasion was initially rather half-baked. When he perceived his moment had arrived, why wasn't his military better prepared? Was it simply a gross underestimation of what he was getting into? To what extent did he feel rushed before his window of opportunity narrowed? Did the possibility of bringing Ukraine into NATO at some point play a role there (not as an offensive threat in Russia but as foreclosing his ambitions)? Was he misinformed or misled? All of the above?
Such errors are not unusual and compound; many such incursions historically go badly, especially in the beginning (examples are too numerous to list, though in the Russian case, their invasion of Afghanistan might deserve a mention; I could also throw in Xerxes' invasion of Greece and Alcibiades' ill-considered invasion of Sicily just for fun). In many ways, this just looks like history repeating itself.
You raise an interesting point regarding the situation Trump left for Biden. Since Trump had no intention of losing the election, the "very bad hand" you mention was one Trump dealt to himself. How did Trump plan to play that hand in his second term? That's a moot point now (since I doubt very much anyone would credibly answer it). But I must suppose he believed it was the best hand he could get and he had some plan to deal with it. (That plan didn't account for COVID.)
In a way, it reminds me a bit of the situation Clinton inherited regarding Iraq. George H. W. Bush clearly didn't plan on losing that election, and absent Ross Perot, he almost certainly would not have. He believed he had another term to settle the situation, so he took a position that might be called either honorable or politically expedient (or both?) It backfired badly in the end, eventually resulting in two other invasions (by us), and here we are today.
Thank you for your input and thanks again to Glenn for graciously allowing this discussion.
Thank you for the reply. I did not mean to imply that I thought Trump was deliberately creating a mess in Afghanistan to leave it for Biden. On the contrary, I think that had Trump been elected he would have ended up being the one to reap that whirlwind - it was just bad policy and only a consequence of timing and the election result that it blew up on Biden's watch. Also a massive intelligence failure.
I agree with you that NATO expansion back in the day was probably not the wisest course, but I still think Putin reacts less out of responding to threat and more out of the desire to rebuild a fallen empire.
One of the craziest things to think about is that back a couple of decades ago, there was serious thought about allowing Russia to JOIN an expanded NATO, even after Putin was first elected but before he showed his true colors.
Yes, the idea things might have still gone sour had Trump been elected cannot be dismissed, although I doubt things overall would have turned out like they did. We will have to see what the future holds.
On your second point, quite so on both counts.
Yes, there were a lot of attempts at cooperation back then. I personally met with senior reps from Lavochkin to explore the possibility of a joint venture I had proposed. They gave us a briefing on the state of things in Russia at the time that was entirely eye opening. They also happened to be staying near where I lived, so I gave them a ride to their hotel. They showered me with gifts in return, including a bar of Russian chocolate. It was a fascinating experience. In the end, nothing came of it and that era (as I've heard) is not recalled fondly in Russia these days, for understandable reasons.
I have some memory of that (Russia joining NATO), though I never got the impression it was especially serious. You may be better informed than myself on that topic as my focus had shifted by that time, but I do recall a desire to enlist Russia's aid in the GWOT, and some overtures to that end. There seemed to be a spike in alarm after Beslan over Russia's possible response, but it faded (at least as far as I was aware) and Basayev's eventual death closed the issue. Around the time, awareness of Putin's true colors (as you say) I think was growing and became clear by 2008.
But I am being prolix now, and will close. You responses are appreciated, and as always, thanks again to Glenn.